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Abstract
One of the main reasons why plan execution meets
with failure is because the environment in which the
plan is being executed does not conform to an agent’s
expectations of how it will behave. If an agent is form-
ing and attempting to execute plans in a given domain,
these plans will be based on the agent’s understand-
ing of the domain, described in its ontology. Errors
in this ontology are likely to lead to plans that are not
executable. We propose to address this problem by
dynamically refining the ontology as execution fail-
ure occurs and replanning using this updated ontology,
thus creating more robust plans that are more likely to
be executable.
Introduction
In order to generate plans that are sure to be exe-
cutable in a given domain, it is necessary to have a
complete and correct understanding of that domain.
In all but the smallest of domains this is unfeasible,
partly because the amount of resources necessary to
fully explore and represent a large domain would be
prohibitive, and partly because the domain may be
dynamic and changing under external and possibly
unpredictable influences. Thus the representation of
the domain is often vague and imprecise and in some
cases may be incorrect. In particular, the understand-
ing of the domain is likely to be oversimplified, with
the increasing detail of the domain becoming clear
only through interaction with the domain. This is a
normal occurrence in human understanding, where
domains that are not well understood by a person
are represented in vague, general terms. During
interaction with that domain, the original representa-
tion seems not to be discarded but instead refined to
include the additional information discovered during
the interaction [7, 9].
We use the word ontology to refer to the whole
of the agent’s knowledge of a domain. This ontology
could be shared or partially shared with other agents,
or could be unique to a particular agent. Within the
ontology, we distinguish between:
 the signature, which describes the types of things
that exist in the domain; for example, listing all the
predicates together with their arity and the type of
the arguments they take;
 the theory, which describes the instantiations of the
signature objects; for example, the specific things
that exist and the rules that describe what actions
can take place in the domain.
Lack of precision is likely to exist in both of these. In
fact, vagueness in the signature entails vagueness in
the theory, as all instances of this part of the signature
in the theory will also be vague.
During plan execution, it is possible to learn
further information about the domain. Failures
in plan execution provide important information
about what parts of the ontology are incomplete or
incorrect, but also result in failure to attain the goal
state. Thus we propose to dynamically refine the
ontology using information about the domain that
was learned during the attempted execution. We
then use this refined ontology to create a plan that
is more robust and more likely to achieve success.
Much work on updating theories has been done in the
related field of belief revision [2, 4, 5], and in some
cases this will be similar to what we are doing. The
difference lies in the fact that belief revision is con-
cerned with semantics and considers beliefs to be unit
objects, whereas we are interested in the syntax of a
belief or ontological object. Also, belief revision is
concerned with the facts themselves, whereas we are
also interested in refining the signature of an ontology.
We believe that a casual understanding of a do-
main will lead to over-simplified ontological objects:
for example, a single predicate where many are
required; predicates with lower arity than necessary;
rules with insufficient numbers of preconditions.
When a richer understanding of the domain is
developed through further interaction, these simple
ontological objects should not be discarded and
replaced, as occurs in belief revision, but instead
should be refined to incorporate the extra detail.
We are interested in situations where the agent’s
ontology is close to a correct understanding of a
domain but fails in parts. Our techniques are not
applicable to a situation where two agents with
completely different ontologies are attempting to
interact but rather to a situation where two agents
have a similar understanding and comprehend much
of what one another is communicating, thus making
it possible to pinpoint a place in which disagreement
occurs. We believe this is a reasonable situation to
consider, since there are many cases where agents
come from a common source and are later developed
independently. One place this occurs often is on the
Semantic Web, where the problem of ontological
mismatch is significant.
The scenario we are interested in is that of a
plan-implementation (PI) agent, attempting to ex-
ecute a plan. The PI agent’s role is to control the
different components of the system and to execute
the actions listed in the plan through interaction with
other agents. This PI agent needs to have access
not only to the plan and the ontology, but also to
a justification of the plan, by which we mean a
description of what rules and facts each plan step
is based on, and an explanation for why they are
believed to be true. This is necessary so that when
a plan step proves to be inexecutable, the reason
for this can be traced back to the ontology. This
justification provides a set of ontological objects,
either in the signature or theory, that may be at fault;
for example, a rule and some preconditions for that
rule with their justification. In order to find the exact
point of failure, further agent communication may
be necessary. The PI agent must question the agent
it expected to perform the action of its plan as to
why the action was not performed; the objects in the
justification are queried and further questions asked
until the point of failure is discovered. The point of
failure is then passed to a refinement system, where
the ontology is altered appropriately. At this stage,
further questions may need to be asked in order to
establish what the correct refinement is. For example,
if the arity of a predicate needs to be increased, what
would be the type of this extra argument?
In this paper we describe a dynamic ontology
refinement system to correct failed plans, hence using
the additional domain information learned during
plan execution failure to create more robust plans.
In Section 2 we discuss how the point of failure is
located through looking at the justification of the
plan and also through further agent communication.
In Section 3 we lay out how we patch this point of
failure. Section 4 outlines the proposed architecture
for the system, Section 5 contains a worked example
and Section 6 concludes the paper.
Locating the cause of failure
We believe that a sensible approach to the problem of
planning with incomplete or incorrect information is
to use an attempted plan execution to learn more about
the domain, and hence develop a better domain de-
scription to facilitate the creation of better plans. This
mirrors the way in which humans cope with the prob-
lem of vague or wrong knowledge. In the real world
it is impossible to understand the complexities of ev-
ery situation we may encounter, or the way these sit-
uations may have changed since we last encountered
them. Humans seem to be very adapt at constantly
refining their ideas and replanning in order to reach a
goal that was unattainable using the initial plan. This
is the kind of technique we are intending to emulate
in this system.
The plan deconstruction
The first step in tracing the cause of plan-execution
failure to a problem in the ontology is to examine
which parts of the ontology were used to justify the
plan step where failure occurred. For example, the
justification for the action buy(tiket) may be a rule
such as:
Rule Name: buy-rule
Preconditions:
at(P lae; Agent) ^
buy at(Thing; P lae; P rie) ^
has(money(X); Agent) ^ X > Prie
Effects: has(Thing;Agent) ^ has(money(X  
Prie); Agent)
together with an explanation for why the pre-
conditions of this rule are held to be true. Note that
the justification of a plan step explains why it should
be possible to perform that plan step and not why the
plan step is necessary. In order to establish where
the fault is, we need to investigate why we thought it
should have been possible to perform the plan step.
Justifications for a plan step will always be formulas
from the theory of the ontology, since it is the specific
beliefs about the domain that are required to form a
plan rather than the general description of the types of
things found in that domain. However, the underlying
error may well occur in the signature of the ontology.
For example, it may be that money should be a
binary predicate, with urreny being the type of the
second argument. This problem would be highlighted
by a failure to execute the buy action due to the
precondition has(money(X)) being incorrectly
stated. So the problem in the signature is revealed
through a failure in the theory. Once the signature
problem has been fixed, all occurrences of it in the
theory need to be altered, including the occurrence
that indicated the problem.
Since this kind of information is hard to extract from
most planners, particularly state-of-the-art planners,
we have developed a plan deconstructor to provide
this information. This is loosely inspired by the plan
validator developed at the University of Durham
by Long and Cresswell [6], to validate plans by
pseudo-executing them. Although the motivation
is very different, the basic idea of justifying each
plan step with reference to the ontology is the same.
The plan deconstructor can be built on top of any
planner. It takes the plan produced by this planner
and deconstructs how it could have been built from
the theory. It is not attempting to literally follow how
the plan was built, it is instead using the theory to
justify the plan that has been produced by the planner,
in order that the justification can be referred to when
failure occurs. This means that the PI agent can nar-
row down the search for the problem to the relevant
area. However, this information is not sufficient to
identify a unique problem; there will still be many
possibilities. If a rule is found to produce the wrong
output it may be that the rule itself is incorrect; it may
be lacking a precondition, for instance. Alternatively,
one of its preconditions may be incorrect, and thus
it is falsely believed that the rule is applicable. If
there is an error in the theory, then the specific fact is
incorrectly held to be true and we must search further
back in the justification to see why we believed this to
be true, thus locating the original source of the error.
If it is due to a lack of precision in the signature,
then we need to update the signature and alter all the
occurrences of this predicate in the theory.
Plan deconstruction example Suppose the plan
deconstructor is passed a plan such as the following
one:
[buy(tiket); walk(station; embassy; bishkek);
buy(visa); travel(bishkek; tashkent; bus)℄
together with the PI agent’s ontology. The plan
deconstructor annotates each action in the following
ways: the rule used is given, together with a reason
for why each of the preconditions are held to be true;
for example, because it is a fact in the theory, or true
in initial state, or true after action X. Also given are
the effects of the action, i.e. what becomes true under
that action, and the current status of the fluents,
or predicates that change value depending on the
situation (for example location and possession of
items). A justification for the above plan as produced
by the plan deconstructor is given below.
Action 1: buy(ticket)
Rule Used: Rule 2
Preconds: at(station;me) initial situation
buy at(tiket; station; 3) fact
has(money(10);me) fact
10 > 3 true
Effects: has(tiket;me)
has(money(10  3); me)
Status: at(station;me)
has(money(7);me)
has(tiket;me)
Action 2: walk(station,embassy,bishkek)
Rule Used: Rule 1
Preconds: at(station;me) initial situation,
status from Action 1
sit(station; bishkek) fact
sit(embassy; bishkek) fact
Effects: at(embassy;me)
:at(station;me)
Status: at(embassy;me)
has(money(7);me)
has(tiket;me)
Action 3: buy(visa)
Rule Used: Rule 2
Preconds: at(embassy;me) result from Action 2
buy at(visa; embassy; 2) fact
has(money(7);me) result from Action 1
7 > 2
Effects: has(visa;me)
has(money(7  2);me)
Status: at(embassy;me)
has(visa;me)
has(tiket;me)
has(money(5);me)
Action 4: travel(bishkek,tashkent,bus)
Rule Used: Rule 3
Preconds: at(embassy;me) results from Action 2,
status from Action 3
sit(embassy; bishkek) fact
transport(bishkek;
tashkent; bus) fact
has(tiket;me) result from Action 1,
status from Actions 2,3
has(visa;me) result from Action 3
Effects: at(tashkent;me)
Status: at(tashkent;me)
has(visa;me)
has(money(5);me)
:has(tiket;me)
Agent communication
As described above, the plan deconstruction alone
is not enough to find the point of failure. It is only
possible through further investigation for the PI agent
to decide exactly what part of the ontology to send
to the refinement system. The PI agent cannot know
exactly why the action failed; however, the agent
with which it is communicating — for example, a
ticket-selling (TS) agent — must have had a reason
for failing to perform the action and must therefore
have information about what the problem point is.
The TS agent will have refused to perform the action
because some part of his ontology prevents the action
being possible; the corresponding part of the PI’s
ontology suggests that it should be possible. Hence
this is where the ontology mismatch occurs, and if the
PI agent wishes to interact successfully with the TS
agent, he must alter this part of his ontology accord-
ingly. Note that we are interested in agents that have
similar but slightly differing ontologies; for example,
agents whose ontologies have originated from the
same source but have been developed separately. The
PI agent is thus persuaded to refine its ontology to
bring it in line with the agent with which it needs
to interact, at least for the fragment of the ontology
that is relevant to the action the PI agent wanted to
execute. It may that there are some parts of the PI
agent’s ontology which it is not prepared to refine. In
this case it will have to look for another agent that
has different requirements to perform the same action.
An example of the kind of communication that
may occur is given below. In this case, the PI agent
has a different ontological representation of the
concept of money to the TS agent. The PI agent
has money represented as a unary predicate taking
a numerical value as an argument, the TS agent,
instead, as a binary predicate taking a numerical
value and a currency as arguments. This could occur
because the PI agent has only ever dealt with one
currency, and thus does not feel the need to specify,
whereas the TS agent may be working in a domain
where different currencies are used.
PI: buy(tiket)
TS: has(money(P; dollars))?
PI: fails has(money(P; dollars))
TS: fails buy(tiket)
In this case the cause of the problem is immedi-
ately clear; the PI agent has been confronted with a
concept of money different to the one currently in
his ontology and must refine his ontology accordingly.
If the cause of the problem is in the signature
of the ontology then it is immediately apparent,
since the PI agent is confronted with predicates
it does not understand. If the problem is with
the theory of the ontology, it is more difficult
to discover and further communication is neces-
sary. For example, the PI agent may have a fact
buy at(tiket; station; 10), whereas the TS agent
may have a fact buy at(tiket ; tiket oÆe; 10 ).
Thus when it comes to check the preconditions for its
selling rule it finds that the PI agent is in the wrong
location and the conversation goes as follows:
PI: buy(tiket)
TS: fails buy(tiket)
The PI must then investigate further by check-
ing which of the preconditions of the rule the TS
agent does not agree with. If all the preconditions are
accepted then the rule itself must be at fault.
Agent communication system Controlling agent
communication is an important aspect of the system.
We need to define what kind of speech acts are
acceptable, whilst at the same time not restricting
this too tightly, so that communication is possible
between agents with somewhat different ontologies.
In order to do this our system is based on the idea of
eInstitutions [8, 10, 11]. We briefly describe these
below, and then outline how we adapt these to our
purposes.
An eInstitution consists of a set of predefined
senes, and transitions between these scenes. A
scene describes what kind of illoutions, or speech
acts, can occur within it, and thus what actions can be
performed here, and are controlled by institution or
admin agents. External agents entering the institution
must take on roles, for example as a buying-agent
or a selling-agent. So for the example situation de-
scribed above, we would need to have a scene where
the buying and selling of tickets was facilitated, plus
scenes allowing whatever other actions we would
wish to be performable. The institution agents ensure
that the scenes, transitions and the institution itself
run smoothly. They do not themselves participate
in the buying or selling activity, or other function of
the institution. The agents who would, for example,
sell tickets, would be external agents who visit the
institution because they wish to sell tickets. The PI
agent will have to rely on the presence of the agents
he wishes to interact with before he can achieve his
goal within a scene.
This type of organisation creates a forum for
our agent interaction. This is how we control how
a PI agent would find the agents with which he
needs to interact, and how, using the institution scene
agents, this interaction is controlled. In the agent’s
ontology, in addition to the domain information, he
has information about which scenes exist, which
agents he can expect to find in which scenes and how
he can move between these scenes.
Refining the problem point
Once the exact source of the problem has been
located, it is sent to the refinement system to be
corrected. At this stage, further communication with
the other agent is likely to be necessary. Since we are
mostly concerned with adding details, we are likely at
this stage to require more information about this extra
detail. For example, if we need to add an argument
to a predicate, we will need to know what the type of
the argument is.
Much work has been done in the field of re-
moving detail from theories (abstraction). Hence,
in order to formulate techniques for adding detail,
we have investigated common abstraction techniques
and considered how to invert these. Walsh and
Giunchiglia claim that almost all abstractions fall into
four categories [3]:
1. Predicate abstractions
mapping predicate names in some uniform way:
e.g. bottle(x), up(x) map onto ontainer(x).
2. Domain abstractions
mapping constants and function symbols in some
uniform way:
e.g. prime(3), prime(5) map onto
prime(oddnumber).
3. Propositional abstractions
dropping some or all of the arguments to predicates:
e.g. abelian(groupA), abelian(groupB) map
onto abelian.
4. Precondition abstractions
mapping some of the atomic formulas onto true or
false:
e.g. has(tiket;me) ! an-travel(me) maps
onto an-travel(me)
From these four types of abstraction we have devel-
oped four kinds of anti-abstractions.
Signature Refinement
Three of these anti-abstractions are signature refine-
ments of the ontology:
1. Predicate anti-abstractions
A single predicate is divided into some number of
sub-predicates:
e.g. money(X) maps onto
dollars(X); euros(X); sterling(X)
2. Domain anti-abstractions
Constants and function symbols are divided up into
different cases:
e.g. money(X; european) maps onto
money(X; euros);money(X; sterling);
money(X; krona)
3. Propositional anti-abstractions
Extra arguments are added to predicates:
e.g. money(X) maps onto
money(X; dollars);money(X; sterling)
Once the refinement has been made to the signature,
this always requires some change in the theory. Since
the error in the signature has led to plan failure, we
know that there must be at least one occurrence of the
signature symbol in the theory that was the cause of
this failure. That, and every other occurrence of the
signature symbol, needs to be altered. This, in most
cases, requires further agent communication in order
for the system to be able to use the new version of
the signature object. In some cases, where it occurs
in parts of the theory that are not related to the agent
that is currently being communicated with, it may not
be possible to immediately instantiate the occurrence
of the signature symbol in the theory, for example, if
a new argument is added it may not be immediately
clear what value this object may take, and it may be
left uninstantiated until it is necessary to instantiate it.
Theory refinements
The theory has two components: rules and facts. One
of the anti-abstractions describes a method for refin-
ing rules by adding preconditions:
 Precondition anti-abstractions
Preconditions can be added to rules:
e.g. the preconditions has(invitation) could be
added to the buy rule in order to purchase a visa:
Rule-name: buy-rule
Preconds:
at(P l) ^
buy at(Thing; P l; P ) ^
has(money(X)) ^
X > P ^ has(invitation)
Effects: has(Thing) ^ has(money(X   P )
In most cases, facts will be refined due to signature re-
finements. However, in some cases we may find facts
causing errors not because they lack detail but because
they are missing entirely, or simply wrong. This may
happen in a dynamic environment, where facts need
to be updated. This kind of alteration is not a refine-
ment but a kind of belief revision. Although this is not
central to our interests since it is not refinement, it is
may well cause problems and we will need tactics to
deal with it.
Refinement example
In the following example, we discuss situations where
these refinements are used. The agent communication
aspect is not discussed in detail; for more information
on this, see the Agent Communication section.
Suppose the PI agent’s next step in the plan is
to perform an action buy-tiket and this is justified
by the following rule in the agent’s ontology:
Rule-name: buy-tiket-rule
Preconds:
at(X;Agent) ^
has(money(A); Agent) ^
transport(X;Y ) ^
has(visa(Area); Agent) ^
ost(X;Y;C) ^ P > C
Effects: has(tiket(X;Y ); Agent) ^
has(money(A  C); Agent),
which, in this case, is instantiated as follows:
Preconds:
at(bishkek;me) ^
has(money(10);me) ^
transport(bishkek; tashkent) ^
has(visa(CIS)) ^
ost(bishkek; tashkent; 5) ^ 10 > 5
Effects: has(tiket(tashkent; bishkek);me) ^
has(money(5);me).
He approaches the appropriate agent and asks
him to perform the buy-tiket action. The TS agent
will have a rule in his own ontology which describes
the conditions under which a ticket can be bought, in
this case of the form:
Preconds:
at(bishkek;Agent) ^
has(money(A; dollars); Agent) ^
has(invitation;Agent) ^
has(visa(uzbek); Agent) ^
bus(bishkek; tashkent) ^
ost(bishkek; tashkent; 5) ^ A > 5
Effects: at(tashkent; Agent) ^ has(money(A  
5); Agent)
Some of these preconditions are fully instanti-
ated already and he can check them himself, for
example bus(bishkek; tashkent). Others are not
instantiated initially, and he may have to check these
with the agent he is communicating with, for example
has(money(A; dollars); Agent). He can imme-
diately instantiate the variable Agent to the name
of the agent he is communicating, but he cannot
tell what A might be until he questions the agent
further. Additionally, he needs to check some
predicates which are fully instantiated: for example,
has(invitation;Agent) will not contain uninstanti-
ated variables once he has inserted the name of the
agent, but its veracity cannot be determined without
questioning the agent.
In order to decide whether he can comply with
the request, he first checks the instantiated predicates.
Since he can find out that bus(bishkek; tashkent)
is correct, he does not need to question it, so al-
though there is an ontology mismatch here, this
does not come to light. Next he asks how much
money the agent has. Since the PI agent is con-
fronted with a predicate that is not of the form
he expects, he passes this to the refinement sys-
tem. Here, has(money(A); Agent) is refined to
has(money(A;Z); Agent), where Z is an extra ar-
gument of unknown type. Further information about
this new argument comes from the PI’s ontology, if
he already knows type information about the object
dollars. Otherwise, he needs to question the TS
agent to discover this information.
Next, the TS agent questions the truth of the
precondition has(invitation;Agent). The PI agent
responds negatively to this response, and so the TS
agent refuses to perform the task. The PI agent
infers from this that has(invitation;Agent) is a
necessary precondition (this is not certain but is a
sensible guess), and the refinement system performs
precondition anti-abstraction on the rule.
Finally, the TS agent questions the
has(visa(uzbek); Agent) precondition. The PI
agent must again reply negatively to this, leading to
failure, but in this case the question is not unexpected,
merely differently instantiated. If the PI agent has the
right information, he will be able to tell that uzbek is
a country within CIS, and thus the refinement system
performs domain anti-abstraction. If he does not
have this information, he extracts it from the TS agent.
At this point, the TS agent performs the ac-
tion, even though there is still an ontological
mismatch: bus(bishkek; tashkent) matching
transport(bishkek; tashkent). This is acceptable
because we are interested in updating ontological
problems that affect plan execution. It is likely that
this ontological mismatch will cause problems at
another point, at which stage it is refined using pred-
icate anti-abstraction. If it never causes problems
then the ontological mismatch remains.
Worked Example
Worked examples for different aspects of the system
are given in the relevant sections. Here, we briefly tie
together these worked examples to describe how the
whole system works.
Firstly, the PI agent forms the plan:
[buy(tiket); walk(station; embassy; bishkek);
buy(visa); travel(bishkek; tashkent; bus)℄.
This is sent to the plan deconstructor, which an-
notates it as previously described and returns it
to the PI agent. The PI agents next attempts to
execute the first action of the plan, buy(tiket). He
communicates with a tiket-selling (TS) agent,
and meets with plan failure. In this case there
is an obvious clue about the cause of the failure,
namely that the TS agent has a different signature
for the object money. This is immediately obvious
from the questioning of the TS agent, and in this
case, recourse to the plan deconstruction is not
immediately necessary. The money(A) object in
the signature is sent to the refinement system, where
propositional anti-abstraction is used to refine it to
money(A;Curreny). Suppose further questioning
of the agent results in the object has(money(10))
being refined to has(money(10; sterling)) in the
theory of this ontology. Once the refinement has been
performed, replanning occurs, which in this case
produce the following plan:
[exhange(10; sterling; dollars); buy(tiket);
walk(station; embassy; bishkek); buy(visa);
travel(bishkek; tashkent; bus)℄.
Note that in some cases the plan looks the same
as the original plan; for example, if the PI agent
discovers that the currency of his money is already
dollars. Then no extra action is required. However,
the new plan is executable where the old one was not,
because the ontology it is based on is more accurate.
Recourse to the justification from the plan de-
construction becomes necessary when no clues are
given by the other agent; for example, in the second
situation described in the Agent Communication
section. Here, the TS agent simply refuses to perform
the action. The PI agent must turn to the justification,
as detailed in the plan deconstruction example, where
he sees that this action is based on rule 2. He queries
each of the preconditions of that rule. If one of these
proves to be at fault, he must look at its justification:
perhaps it is incorrectly stated in the theory of the
ontology, or perhaps it was made true by some other
rule, and in that case the PI agent must look further
back for the cause of the failure.
Architecture
Planner
Plan Deconstructor
Plan +ontology
PI Agent
Goal +ontology
Annotated plan
illocutions
System
Refinement
Fixed problem
Problem point
1 
2
3
4
5
6
Circled numbers indicate order in which parts of the system are called
Dotted line indicates that both the PI agents and the TS agents are currently visiting the eInstitution 
eInstitution
Other
(TS)
Agent
Figure 1: Architecture and interaction of a dynamic
ontology-refinement system
The system is controlled by a central plan imple-
mentation (PI) agent. The PI agent has access to the
ontology that describes the domain. These are sent
to the planner, in a suitable translation (for example,
PDDL [1]), together with the goal the PI agent wants
to achieve. The planner outputs a plan and this, to-
gether with the original ontological theory, is sent to
the plan deconstructor, which will return the plan, an-
notated with a justification, to the PI agent. At this
stage the PI agent attempts to execute the plan through
communication with other agents. If failure occurs,
the PI agent examines the justification developed by
the plan deconstructor and then, through further com-
munication with the agent he is interacting with, pin-
points the exact point of failure. This is then sent to
the refinement system, where a decision is made about
how to refine the problem and further communication
with other agents, via the PI agent, is likely to occur.
The refinement is then sent back to the PI agent, who
deletes the original problem from the ontology and re-
places it with the refined version. The process is then
repeated with the updated ontology, and a more robust
plan is developed.
Conclusions and further work
We have identified the problem of ontological mis-
match as a major factor in plan execution failure. We
have presented a way in which these ontological mis-
matches can be identified by plan-implementation
agents and then refined. This refined ontology can
then be used to produce a new plan which stands a
better chance of being executable. As many plans
are executed in the same domain, the understanding
of that domain will become more sophisticated and
accurate, and further plans created for that domain
will be more likely to be executable.
So far we have developed the plan deconstruc-
tor and the refinement system, and we have decided
what these refinements are and how they work. Our
next focus is the agent communication system, and
we are focusing on eInstitutions as our communi-
cation framework. Due to the kind of speech acts
we require, we expect that additional work beyond
eInstitutions may need to be done.
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